蒯因的知识论范式能否验证本体论的相对性

Can Quine's Epistemological Paradigm Verify the Relativity of Ontology

  • 摘要: 针对传统知识论以科学知识多类型演进与语言表达式为视角对本体论相对性所提出的质疑,蒯因以整体主义知识论予以回应。蒯因将科学知识视为不断接受经验证伪和修正的系统,据此证实本体论只有相对于特定的知识背景才能彰明自身的理论意义。蒯因的整体主义知识论以实用性为准则来构建科学知识的系统,对满足本体论相对性合理需要的部分知识加以过滤和选取,结果在承认科学知识可被修改的同时否认各部分知识之间相互比较的可能性。蒯因验证策略的实质在于借用知识论的相对性为本体论的相对性进行辩护,这致使他跌入狭隘的相对主义深渊,其本体论对“何物存在”的探讨也沦为空洞的承诺。

     

    Abstract: Quine responded to the question of ontological relativity raised by traditional epistemology from the perspective of multi-type evolution of scientific knowledge and language expression. Quine regards scientific knowledge as a system that is constantly being falsified and revised by experience, thus confirming that ontology can only manifest its theoretical significance relative to a specific knowledge background. Quine's holism theory of knowledge builds a system of scientific knowledge based on the principle of "convenience to use", and filters and selects some knowledge that meets the reasonable needs of ontological relativity. As a result, scientific knowledge can be modified and each part of knowledge incomparable conflict. The essence of Quine's verification strategy is to use the relativity of epistemology to defend the relativity of ontology, which leads him to fall into the abyss of narrow relativism, and his ontology's discussion of "what exists" also falls into the rut of empty promises.

     

/

返回文章
返回