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HU Ze-hong, GAO Bei-bei. Grounded Proposition: The Solution of Minimalist Theory of Truth to Liar Paradox[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2019, (4): 176-182.
Citation: HU Ze-hong, GAO Bei-bei. Grounded Proposition: The Solution of Minimalist Theory of Truth to Liar Paradox[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2019, (4): 176-182.

Grounded Proposition: The Solution of Minimalist Theory of Truth to Liar Paradox

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  • Received Date: March 19, 2019
  • Available Online: March 21, 2021
  • Facing the challenge of liar paradox, the minimalist theory of truth tried to avoid the paradox through defining the acceptable instance of the equivalence schema with the grounded proposition as the discriminant standard based on the true predicate and the use theory of meaning. In order to make up the shortcomings caused by the non-grounded proposition, Paul Horwich further proposed the semantic epistemicism, which defines the acceptable instance of the equivalence schema from the semantic level together with the grounded proposition.
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