Abstract: How the reform of the environmental judicial system affects the green innovation behavior of enterprises is of great significance for exploring and practicing China's green development path. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the three parties of "local procuratorates-local governments-enterprises", and takes the environmental public interest litigation policy as the research entry point, adopts the DID model for empirical testing, explores the strategic choice and evolutionary path of the game subjects before and after the implementation of the environmental public interest litigation policy, and analyzes the policy's mechanism and implementation effect. The results show that: first, the environmental public interest litigation pilot effectively promotes enterprises to carry out substantive green innovation, which is reflected in the improvement of the quality of green innovation and the reduction of greenwashing behavior. Second, in terms of the mechanism of action, the environmental public interest litigation pilot mainly promotes the green innovation of enterprises by strengthening regional environmental supervision, curbing government-enterprise collusion and improving the regional rule of law environment. Third, the pilot policy mainly promotes the substantive green innovation activities of state-owned enterprises, enterprises in regions with high public environmental attention, and enterprises with competitive market structures.This provides important empirical evidence for a comprehensive understanding of the micro-mechanism and differentiated effects of environmental public interest litigation, and for improving the environmental justice to promote the green transformation of enterprises.