• Overview of Chinese core journals
  • Chinese Science Citation Database(CSCD)
  • Chinese Scientific and Technological Paper and Citation Database (CSTPCD)
  • China National Knowledge Infrastructure(CNKI)
  • Chinese Science Abstracts Database(CSAD)
  • JST China
  • SCOPUS
HE Guangwen, LI Qian. Fiscal and Tax Support and Village and Township Bank Performance: "Development View" or "Dependence View"—Evidence from the Panel Data of 1 177 Village and Township Banks in China[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2021, (2): 5-18.
Citation: HE Guangwen, LI Qian. Fiscal and Tax Support and Village and Township Bank Performance: "Development View" or "Dependence View"—Evidence from the Panel Data of 1 177 Village and Township Banks in China[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2021, (2): 5-18.

Fiscal and Tax Support and Village and Township Bank Performance: "Development View" or "Dependence View"—Evidence from the Panel Data of 1 177 Village and Township Banks in China

More Information
  • Received Date: January 31, 2020
  • Available Online: April 06, 2021
  • Evaluation of the influence of the government's fiscal and tax support of Village and Township Banks(VTBs) on their performance is not only a major issue concerning whether government economic interventions are effective and accurate in relieving the market failure but also a core issue in the achieving VTBs' social and financial goals. Based on the unbalanced panel data of 1, 177 VTBs from 2015 to 2018, the impact of fiscal and tax support of government on promoting the social and financial performance of VTBs is examined using a two-way fixed effect model. The study finds that tax preference has significant positive influence while fiscal subsidies even have significant negative influence on growth of VTBs. The positive effect of tax preference on the outreach and profitability of VTBs is gradually weakened with the increase of operation time. Due to their dependence on supporting tax and fiscal policies, the self-sustainability of VTBs has not been effectively improved. This verifies the "dependence view" on fiscal and tax support.
  • [1]
    STIGLITZ J E, WEISS A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information[J]. The American economic review, 1981, 71 (3): 393-410. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010965
    [2]
    STIGLITZ J E. Markets, market failures, and development[J]. The American economic review, 1989, 79 (2): 197-203. http://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a79_3ay_3a1989_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a197-203.htm
    [3]
    ADAMS D W, VON PISCHKE J D. Microenterprise credit programs: déja vu[J]. World development, 1992, 20 (10): 1463-1470. doi: 10.1016/0305-750X(92)90066-5
    [4]
    张杰, 陈志远, 杨连星, 等. 中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估: 理论与证据[J]. 经济研究, 2015, 50 (10): 4-17. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201510002.htm
    [5]
    张帆, 张友斗. 竞争性领域财政补贴、税收优惠政策对企业经营绩效的影响[J]. 财贸研究, 2018, 29 (3): 80-89. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CMYJ201803008.htm
    [6]
    SHLEIFER A. State versus private ownership[J]. Journal of economic perspectives, 1998, 12 (4): 133-150. doi: 10.1257/jep.12.4.133
    [7]
    TZELEPIS D, SKURAS D. The effects of regional capital subsidies on firm performance: an empirical study[J]. Journal of small business & enterprise development, 2004, 11 (1): 121-129. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/reference/XREF?id=10.1108/14626000410519155
    [8]
    唐清泉, 罗党论. 政府补贴动机及其效果的实证研究-来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2007(6): 149-163. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRYJ200706016.htm
    [9]
    余明桂, 回雅甫, 潘红波. 政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性-来自中国民营上市公司的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2010, 45 (3): 65-77.
    [10]
    程恩江, 褚保金, 刘大耕. 我国农村信用社经营状况、补贴及其政策含义: 以江苏为例[J]. 金融研究, 2003 (3): 98-104. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRYJ200303011.htm
    [11]
    柳光强, 杨芷晴, 曹普桥. 产业发展视角下税收优惠与财政补贴激励效果比较研究-基于信息技术、新能源产业上市公司经营业绩的面板数据分析[J]. 财贸经济, 2015 (8): 38-47. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CMJJ201508005.htm
    [12]
    柳光强. 税收优惠、财政补贴政策的激励效应分析-基于信息不对称理论视角的实证研究[J]. 管理世界, 2016 (10): 62-71. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ201610006.htm
    [13]
    GONZALEZ L I. Political power, fiscal crises, and decentralization in Latin America: federal countries in comparative perspective (and some contrasts with unitary cases)[J]. Publius, 2007, 38 (2): 211-247. doi: 10.1093/publius/pjn001
    [14]
    林毅夫, 李志赟. 政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J]. 经济研究, 2004 (2): 17-27. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200402002.htm
    [15]
    俞乔, 赵昌文. 政治控制、财政补贴与道德风险: 国有银行不良资产的理论模型[J]. 经济研究, 2009, 44 (6): 73-82. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200906006.htm
    [16]
    彭熠, 胡剑锋. 财税补贴优惠政策与农业上市公司经营绩效-实施方式分析与政策启示[J]. 四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2009 (3): 86-94. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SCDZ200903012.htm
    [17]
    LEDGERWOOD J. Sustainable banking with poor: microfinance handbook-an institutional and financial perspective[R]. World bank, December 1998: 42-45.
    [18]
    CHRISTEN R P, LYMAN T. Guiding principles for regulation and supervision of microfinance[M]. Washington DC: CGAP, 2003: 8-16.
    [19]
    杨芷晴. 不同产权性质下的地方政府财政补贴质量-来自中国企业-员工匹配调查(CEES)的证据[J]. 金融经济学研究, 2016, 31 (3): 51-59. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JIRO201603005.htm
    [20]
    YARON. Successful rural finance institutions[Z]. World bank discussion papers, No. 150, 1992.
    [21]
    张正平, 王麦秀. 小额信贷机构能兼顾服务穷人与财务可持续的双重目标吗?-来自国际小额信贷市场的统计证据及其启示[J]. 农业经济问题, 2012, 33 (1): 98-109. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-NJWT201201016.htm
    [22]
    孔东民, 李天赏. 政府补贴是否提升了公司绩效与社会责任?[J]. 证券市场导报, 2014 (6): 26-31. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZQDB201406006.htm
    [23]
    于赛渊. 财政补贴对企业社会经济效益影响的实证[J]. 统计与决策, 2017 (20): 181-184. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-TJJC201720047.htm
    [24]
    BERGSTRÖM F. Capital subsidies and the performance of firms[J]. Small business economic, 2000 (14): 183-193. http://rsa.tandfonline.com/servlet/linkout?suffix=CIT0004&dbid=16&doi=10.1080%2F21681376.2017.1307784&key=10.1023%2FA%3A1008133217594

Catalog

    Article views (1202) PDF downloads (493) Cited by()

    /

    DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
    Return
    Return