| Citation: |
LIU Xichuan, YANG Mengyao. Residual Control Arrangements in Cooperative Financial Organizations: Understanding Clarification and Institutional Reconstruction[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2024, (1): 22-40.
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China's cooperative financial organizations are driven by two thoughts of co-operative thought and joint-stock thought in the process of designing residual control system arrangement. The former emphasizes member-led and democratic decision-making, while the latter emphasizes risk responsibility and risk control ability. However, these two thoughts and their related democratic, centralized and decentralized design ideas fail to achieve the matching of capabilities, rights, risks and benefits among members.This paper reflects on and clarifies the cooperative elements and shareholding elements in the design of residual control rights system of cooperative financial organizations, and constructs an analytical framework of "institutional rule-institutional process-institutional goal". This paper analyzes and compares the democratic decision-making mode of residual control, the initiator control mode and the decentralization mode, which represent democratic thinking, centralization thinking and decentralization thinking respectively. Looking forward to the future, the institutional arrangement of residual control rights in cooperative financial organizations should be understood as a special financial intermediary. Focusing on the core contradiction of the conflict of interests of large and small shareholders, the residual control rights should be allocated according to the two principles of risk matching and capability matching, so as to achieve the matching of capabilities, rights, risks and returns among members of the organization.
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