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HE Jing, LEI Mengjiao. Inclusive Finance Effect under the Asymmetric Allocation of Equity and Control Rights of Rural Commercial Banks[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2023, (1): 81-95.
Citation: HE Jing, LEI Mengjiao. Inclusive Finance Effect under the Asymmetric Allocation of Equity and Control Rights of Rural Commercial Banks[J]. Journal of South China normal University (Social Science Edition), 2023, (1): 81-95.

Inclusive Finance Effect under the Asymmetric Allocation of Equity and Control Rights of Rural Commercial Banks

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  • Received Date: September 25, 2022
  • Available Online: March 16, 2023
  • The provincial associations has changed the corporate governance structure of rural commercial banks, presenting a corporate governance model including provincial associations, major shareholders, minority shareholders and senior managers, but there are few studies have accurately characterized this and analyzed its influences.This paper defines the phenomenon that the provincial association obtains partial control rights of shareholders through the administrative authorization of the provincial government as the theory of asymmetric allocation of equity and control rights in rural commercial banks for the first time, measures the degree of asymmetric allocation through the proportion of appointed directors by provincial associations, and tests the impact of asymmetric allocation of equity and control rights on the inclusive finance in rural commercial banks empirically. The study found that the asymmetric allocation of equity and control rights will enhance the financial inclusion effect, increase agriculture-related loans and small micro loans of rural commercial banks. This paper also used the IPO of rural commercial banks as an exogenous event to identify the influence of asymmetric allocation about equity and control rights on financial inclusion, the results are still robust. Further research shows that, compared with private enterprises, when the largest shareholder is rural commercial bank, the financial inclusion effect under asymmetric allocation will be strengthened. Whether the directors appointed by provincial association hold shares or not will have no effect on the level of financial inclusion under the asymmetric allocation of equity and control rights. Different from the previous critical research on the provincial associations, this paper shows that the provincial association has a certain positive significance in developing inclusive finance of rural commercial banks.
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