高管团队权力和薪酬构成对高管离职的跨层影响

Cross-level Effects of Top Management Team Power and Compensation Composition on Top Managers' Turnover

  • 摘要: 基于组织等级理论和公平理论的基本假定,以2011—2016年2 732家沪深两市A股上市企业的高管为样本,探索高管团队权力和薪酬构成对高管下一年个人离职行为的跨层影响,结果发现,高管团队权力和薪酬构成特征对高管离职的影响具有较大差异。从个人层面来看,高管与其他成员的权力差异能够显著抑制高管下一年的离职行为,且高管的权力水平加强了权力差异与高管离职之间的负向关系;然而,高管与其他成员的薪酬差异对其下一年的离职行为却具有显著的促进作用,且高管的薪酬水平削弱了薪酬差异与高管离职之间的正向关系。从团队跨层影响来看,高管团队权力不平等对高管下一年的离职行为有显著的抑制作用,而薪酬不平等则显著促进了高管个人的离职行为。

     

    Abstract: Based on the basic assumptions of organizational hierarchy theory and equity theory, this study used top managers from 2 732 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2011 to 2016 as a sample and explored the cross-level effects of top management team (TMT) power and compensation composition on top managers' turnover in the next year. The results showed that the influences of TMT power and compensation composition on top managers' turnover were quite different. At the individual level, power dissimilarity between top managers and other TMT members significantly reduced top managers' turnover in the next year, and top managers' power level strengthened the negative relationship between power dissimilarity and top managers' turnover. However, compensation dissimilarity between top managers and other TMT members significantly promoted top managers' turnover in the next year, and top managers' compensation level weakened the positive relationship between compensation dissimilarity and top managers' turnover. At the team level, TMT power inequality significantly reduced top managers' turnover in the next year, whereas TMT compensation inequality significantly promoted top managers' turnover in the next year.

     

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